In two experiments, observers received information about a stimulus person and then attributed a given level of morality to that person. Attributions of morality based on the stimulus person's immoral (as opposed to moral) behavior were relatively unaffected by situational demands surrounding the behavior. That is, a person who stole or committed adultery was judged to be relatively immoral, regardless of situational pressures that appeared to facilitate the behavior. Varying the type of situational demand (reward vs. cost) did not alter this basic effect. Unlike morality attributions, causal attributions based on moral and immoral behavior were affected by situational demands to an equal extent. The results also indicated that impressions of morality formed in one context readily generalized to other aspects of morality. For example, a person who committed adultery was thought to be more likely to lie and steal than one who was not adulterous.
In two experiments, observers received information about a stimulus person and then attributed a given level of morality to that person. Attributions of morality based on the stimulus person's immoral (as opposed to moral) behavior were relatively unaffected by situational demands surrounding the behavior. That is, a person who stole or committed adultery was judged to be relatively immoral, regardless of situational pressures that appeared to facilitate the behavior. Varying the type of situational demand (reward vs. cost) did not alter this basic effect. Unlike morality attributions, causal attributions based on moral and immoral behavior were affected by situational demands to an equal extent. The results also indicated that impressions of morality formed in one context readily generalized to other aspects of morality. For example, a person who committed adultery was thought to be more likely to lie and steal than one who was not adulterous.
It is well known that negative information weighs heavily in one's overall impression of a person (Kanouse & Hanson, 1972) . For example, a single immoral behavior (such as stealing) is often enough to sour one's evaluation of a person. Further, this negative evaluation tends to persist even when the person is simultaneously credited with several very laudatory behaviors (Birnbaum, 1972 (Birnbaum, , 1973 . A second well-known finding is that, in general, dispositional attributions are influenced by situational demands surrounding an actor's behavior (Jones, Davis, & Gergen, 1961; Kelley & Michela, 1980) . The extent that situational demands affect the interpretation of immoral behavior, however, is an unresolved issue (Fincham & Jaspers, 1980, p. 84; Hamilton, 1980; Kane, Joseph, & Tedeschi, 1977; Kelley, 1971; Ross & DiTecco, 1975) . The "negativity" effect described previously raises the following possibility: Immoral behavior may prompt the attribution of relatively immoral dispositional characteristics, regardThis research was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation (BNS-7914046) to the first author. Parts of the first experiment were reported at the meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, Detroit, May, 1981 . The authors would like to thank Victoria Johnsson, Steve Clark, and Steve Sell for help in collecting data. The authors thank Marilynn Brewer, David Messick, and Diane Morgan for helpful ideas.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Glenn D. Reeder, Department of Psychology, Illinois State University, Normal, Illinois 61761. less of situational demands. The research to follow examines this possibility by comparing attributions based on moral and immoral behavior.
The present approach focuses on two sources of attributional information. The first source concerns the effect of situational demands. A robust finding in this area is that observers' dispositional inferences tend to correspond to observed behavior to the extent the behavior appears free of (or at variance with) demands (Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1972) . For example, suppose an actor behaves in a moral way. Observers should be more likely to attribute high morality to the actor when the behavior occurs in a situation conducive to immorality rather than morality (Jones et al., 1961) . Also, the impact of situational demands is likely to depend on the salience or perceived strength of the demands (Miller, 1976; Snyder& Jones, 1974) .
A second source of attributional information pertains to the beliefs observers hold (Kelley & Michela, 1980; Sabini & Silver, 1982) . Reeder and Brewer (1979) propose that observers hold implicit beliefs about the relations between dispositional levels and the behaviors that these dispositions imply. Beliefs linking dispositional levels with categories of behavior are called implicational schemata (or implicational relations). These relations sometimes take an asymmetrical form. For example, where morality dimensions are concerned, it is possible that an immoral dis-position implies a wider range of behaviors than does a moral disposition. In a recent study, Reeder, Henderson, and Sullivan (1982) asked observers questions of the form, "If a large reward were available for doing so, how likely is it that a person who is very moral (immoral) would try to act very immoral (moral)?" Responses were made on a scale with endpoints labeled "not very likely" and "very likely," respectively. The results are clear. Immoral persons are believed far more likely to attempt noncorrespondent (dispositionally discrepant) behavior than are moral persons. Specifically, although immoral persons are believed likely to attempt moral behavior when it is advantageous to do so, moral persons are not expected to initiate immoral action.
These implicational relations may influence the extent to which situational demands influence dispositional attributions: If only immoral persons are believed likely to attempt immoral behavior, it follows that the presence of such behavior directly implies the actor is immoral. Thus, immoral behavior should produce a relatively correspondent (immoral) dispositional inference, regardless of the situational demands surrounding the behavior. The presence of moral behavior, however, may lead to a less certain inference. Both moral and immoral persons are thought likely to attempt moral behavior when it is to their advantage. Thus, when moral behavior occurs in the presence of facilitating demands, observers should be uncertain of the appropriate dispositional inference, and dispositional attributions are likely to regress toward the center of the morality scale. The same moral behavior, though, when inconsistent with situational demands, should produce a strong inference that the actor is moral. In summary, the foregoing assumptions suggest that attributions based on immoral behavior should be less affected by situational demands than those based on moral behavior.
In the following research, observers judged the morality of stimulus persons who behaved in moral or immoral ways in response to various situational demands. The first experiment examined morality judgments in a situation dealing with honesty: In one scenario, observers judged several persons who did or did not return a lost $20 bill; in a second scenario, observers judged persons who either contributed to or stole from a charity fund. A second experiment explored morality judgments dealing with marital fidelity. Observers judged several persons who either were or were not faithful to their respective spouses. This second study varied the nature of situational demands to include rewards as well as costs. In addition, observers' causal attributions were assessed.
Experiment 1

Method
Overview and Design
All subjects rated the morality of four male stimulus persons. Each stimulus person represented one of the four cells of the basic 2 (behavior: moral or immoral) X 2 (situational demand: for moral or for immoral behavior) within-subjects design. A between-subjects variable, scenario, was included to increase generalizability. Subjects randomly assigned to the "lost and found" scenario read stories about several persons who returned or did not return a lost $20 bill. In the "charity" scenario, the stimulus persons either gave to a charity fund or stole from it.
A within-subjects design was employed for several reasons. First, large individual differences are likely whenever moral judgments are made (Forsyth, 1980, p. 175 ). The present design provides a means for controlling this source of variance. Second, the design facilitates comparison with prior work on moral judgment (Birnbaum, 1972 (Birnbaum, , 1973 , which also utilized a within-subjects format. Finally, this design reduces the possibility that subjects will use the response scale differently in the moral and immoral behavior conditions.
Subjects
Twenty male and female college students (at Illinois State University) provided data in each of the two scenario conditions. Subjects participated in groups of three to eight.
Procedure
Lost-and-found scenario. Subjects read a one-page story about each of four different male college students. In all stories, the stimulus person and a fellow student are asked by their instructor to obtain a movie projector from another building. On the way to get the projector, they observe a third person unknowingly drop a $20 bill. The stimulus person then picks up the money. In the immoral demand condition, the stimulus person's fellow student urges him to "keep the money. He'll probably never miss it. There is no way you could get into trouble." In the moral demand condition, the fellow student Says, "You'd better return the money. He'll probably really 
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Note. Higher numbers indicate greater attributed morality.
miss it. Besides, you could get into trouble by keeping it." The stimulus person then responds to these demands by either shouting to the person ahead and returning the money (moral behavior) or pocketing the money for himself (immoral behavior). The order of the four stories was randomized separately for each subject Charity scenario. Subjects read short stories about four male college students, each of whom meets a young woman at a party. After the party, the couple stops at a local restaurant for a pizza. An employee takes their order at the counter and disappears into the kitchen. The couple notices a large sign propped on the counter reading, "GIVE TO THE ORPHANS OF AMERICA." In the moral demand condition, the stimulus person's date requests that he donate some money to the fund. In the immoral demand condition, she requests him to steal the money already in the fund so they can buy some liquor. The stimulus person responds in the moral behavior condition by giving a dollar's worth of change to the orphans' fund. The person in the immoral behavior condition, however, tips over the can holding the previous donations and takes fifty cents for himself. The ordering of the four stories and the instructions were the same as in the previous scenario.
Upon completing the experiment, subjects were debriefed. During the debriefing, subjects received an explanation of the purpose ; of the experiment,'were informed that the stories were completely fictitious, and were thanked for their participation.
Dependent Measures
Subjects judged the morality of each of the four stimulus persons they read about. The scale endpoints were labeled 1 ("very immoral") and 11 ("very moral"), respectively. Subjects were also asked to estimate how often each stimulus person tells a lie. Ratings were made on a scale with endpoints labeled 1 ("never") and 11 ("very often"), respectively. Finally, subjects were asked to rate the honesty of the average male college student on a scale ' with endpoints labeled 1 ("very dishonest") and 11
("very honest"), respectively.
Results
Attributions of Morality
Preliminary analyses revealed no consistent pattern of results involving sex of subject. Therefore, this variable was not included in the analyses reported. The major prediction was that attributions of morality would be less affected by situational demands when based on immoral, as opposed to moral, behavior. Supporting this expectation, a 2(behavior) X 2(situational demand) X 2(scenario) mixed-design analysis of variance revealed a significant interaction of behavior and demand F(l, 38) = 9.25, p < .01. These attributions are displayed in Table 1 . Although situational demands significantly affect ratings based on both immoral (M-3.08 vs. M = 4.50) and moral behavior (M = 7.05 vs. M = 9.65), the magnitude of the effect is less in the immoral behavior condition.
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Other results indicate that morality was rated higher in the moral (M = 8.35) than the immoral behavior condition (M = 3.79), F( 1, 38) = 225.70, p < .001, and higher in the immoral (M = 7.08) than in the moral demand condition (M=5.07), F(\, 38)= 85.58, p < .001. The analysis also revealed a significant interaction of Behavior X Scenario, F(\, 38) = 7.16, p < .01, that has little theoretical interest.
Judged Propensity to Lie
A second attributional measure was included to determine if impressions generalized to a dimension of morality not directly related to the observed behavior. For this purpose, subjects estimated how often the stimulus person told a lie. These estimates largely paralleled the morality attributions. Lying was estimated to occur more often when the person behaved in an immoral (M= 7.16) than in a moral (M =4.51) way, F(l, 38) = 85.30, p < .001, and more often in the moral (M *= 6.53) than the immoral demand condition (M = 5.15), P(l, 38) = 50.89,p< .001.
Finally, situational demands exerted less of an effect in the immoral (M = 7.70 and 6.62 for moral and immoral situational demands, respectively) than moral (M = 5.35 and 3.67 for moral and immoral situational demands, respectively) behavior condition, F(l, 38) = 4.87, p < .05.
Prior Probability
Previous work (Jones & Harris, 1967) indicates that observers' beliefs about the prior probability of a disposition can affect attributions. Subjects in the present study judged the honesty of the average male college student. These ratings fell near the center of the 11-point scale (M = 6.25). Thus, it is unlikely that beliefs about the prior probability of moral dispositions could have produced the major findings of this study.
Discussion
The major prediction of the first study received support. Attributions of morality were less influenced by situational demands when based on immoral, as opposed to moral, behavior. Of secondary interest, impressions tended to generalize to another dimension of morality. For example, observers estimated that a person who failed to return a lost $20 bill was also prone to telling lies (compared to someone who returned the money). The large magnitude of this latter finding raises the possibility that observers perceive a close relation between the various aspects of morality. Finally, auxiliary data suggest that the results just summarized are not a consequence of beliefs about the prior probability of morality dispositions.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 addresses several issues. First, we need to know if the results of the first experiment extend to other types of moral behavior. For this purpose, marital fidelity was chosen for study. Observers received information about a female stimulus person who behaved in a faithful or unfaithful way in relation to her husband. In addition, situational demands were varied so as to facilitate faithful or unfaithful behavior on her part. We expected that unfaithful behavior would prompt attributions of low morality that are relatively unaffected by situational demands.
Second, the generality of moral impressions is of concern, The first study suggests that people may view the various aspects of morality as interrelated. Marital infidelity, stealing, and lying involve rather different behaviors. However, because each implies low morality, people may expect them to 'co-occur. The research to follow explored this possibility.
Third, the nature of situational demands is at issue. Both Heider (1958, p. 246) and Kelley (1972, p. 21) propose that immoral action is viewed less negatively when taken to avoid loss than when taken to secure gain (see Wells, 1980) . The stimulus persons in the present study were described as young, married, and seeking an acting career in the movies. During the course of an encounter with an influential male producer, each actress is exposed to strong situational demands either to have or not to have sex with the producer. In one case, the situational demands offer her a potential gain over her present circumstances (the possibility of becoming a star). In another case, the demands threaten a loss compared to the present circumstances (her career could be ruined). The research explores the possibility that a different pattern of attribution will emerge for the "costly" as opposed to the "rewarding" situational demands.
Finally, Experiment 2 investigates causal .attributions in addition to morality attributions. Recently, Hamilton (1980) drew a distinction between causal attribution and the attribution of personal dispositions like morality. According to Hamilton, causal attributions are concerned with explaining why or how events occur. In contrast, dispositional attributions (morality attributions) are concerned with assessing the actor's responsibility for his or her behavior. It is possible that these two types of measures are affected in different ways by situational demands surrounding an actor's behavior. For example, under some circumstances, observers may explain immoral behavior primarily in terms of situational, rather than dispositional, causes ("The bribe was too attractive for him to resist."). However, observers may still hold the actor morally responsible for the behavior ("A moral person wouldn't have taken the bribe."). The present experiment examines this possibility by assessing causal attributions to situational and dispositional factors.
Method
Design and Subjects
All subjects rated the morality of four female stimulus persons, each of whom represented one of the four cells of the basic 2(behavior: moral or immoral) X 2(situational demand: for moral or for immoral behavior) design. The reward versus cost nature of the situational demands was manipulated as a between-subjects variable. Ten men and 10 women provided data in each of these latter two conditions. Subjects participated in groups of three to six.
Procedure
Reward condition. Each subject received written information about four female stimulus persons. The stimulus persons were described as young movie actresses who have each been married for about 1 year. In the stories, each actress is invited to the office of an influential producer who, the actress believes, is sexually attracted to her. Before visiting the producer, the actress consults a very knowledgeable friend (who is an actress). In the moral demand condition, her experienced friend recommends that she avoid having sex with the producer. "Whatever you do, don't sleep with him.. . .He is just testing to see if you are a serious actress or a floozy.-He will respect you if you turn him down. If he thinks you are a serious actress, he will. . , make you a star." In the immoral demand condition her friend says, "He will really push your career if you sleep with him. This guy could make you a star."
The actress met the producer in his private office. Shortly thereafter, the producer told her "he wanted her from the first time he saw her." He then pulled a "hidea-bed" from his sofa and asked her to take off her clothes. In the moral behavior condition, the actress quickly grabbed her coat and said, "Sorry, I'm not interested. I'm leaving right now." She left immediately. In the immoral behavior condition, she started to unbutton her blouse and said, "Let's make love."
Cost condition. In the cost condition, the basic scenario and behavior of the stimulus person remain unchanged. However, at the time she receives advice from her knowledgeable friend, she is told about the potential costs involved in the situation. In the moral demand condition, her friend advises, "Whatever you do, don't sleep with him.... He is just testing to see if you are a serious actress or a floozy. He won't respect you if you sleep with him . . . he'll prevent you from getting good parts from now on. This guy could ruin you." In the immoral demand condition, the friend suggests that "He will try to ruin your career if you don't sleep with him. This guy could spoil your chances of being a star."
The order of the four stories was randomized separately for each subject. At the end of the study, subjects were completely debriefed and thanked for their participation.
Dependent Measures
Subjects rated the stimulus person's morality and judged her propensity to lie on the same scales used in the previous experiment. In addition, they were asked to decide on a scale ranging from 1 ("no: it is very unlikely") to 11 ("yes: it is very likely") if the stimulus person would ever steal anything. Causal attributions to a dispositional factor were made on a scale ranging from 1 ("not at all influenced by her personality") to 11 ("very much influenced by her personality"). Causal attributions about the extent to which her behavior was influenced by the situation were made on a scale ranging from 1 ("not at all influenced") to 11 ("very much influenced"). Finally, a measure of the subjective prior probability of faithfulness in marriage and a check on the reward/cost manipulation were included.
Results
Manipulation Check on the Reward/Cost Variable
As a check on the effectiveness of the reward/cost variable, observers were asked to rate the extent to which the stimulus person's friend stressed the rewards or costs in the situation. A Behavior X Situational Demand X Reward/Cost (mixed-design) analysis of variance indicates observers perceived costs to a greater extent in the cost (M = 8.09) than the reward (M=3.24) condition, F(l, 38) = 51.57, p< .001. The analysis also revealed effects of situational demand as well as Behavior X Situational Demand and Behavior X Situational Demand X Reward/Cost interactions, F(l, 38) = 7.74, 8.72, and 7.01, respectively, /7s<.01. Because these latter results are not large (in relation to the main effect of the reward/cost variable), they will not be discussed further.
Attributions of Morality
A three-way analysis of variance supported the prediction of an interaction between behavior and situational demand, F(\, 38) = 6.49, p < .02. As shown in Table 2 , situational demands exerted a strong effect when attributions were based on moral (faithful) behavior (M = 7.73 and 9.28 for moral and immoral situational demands, respectively), /*"(!, 38)= 17.22, /?<.001; however, situational demands had a relatively weak effect in the immoral (unfaithful) behavior condition (M = 2.85 and 3.38 for moral and immoral situational demands, respectively), F(l, 38) = 2.01, ns. Other results indicate that ratings of morality were higher in the moral (M = 8.51) than immoral (M=3.12) behavior condition, F(l, 38) = 195.35, p < .001. This difference due to behavior was magnified in the reward (M = 9.08 and 2.38 for moral and immoral behavior, respectively) compared to the cost condition (M = 7.93 and 3.85 for moral and immoral behavior, respectively), F(i, 38) = 11.59, p < .01. Finally, ratings of morality were -higher in the immoral (M = 6.33) than the moral (M = 5.29) demand condition, F(l, 38) = 10.88, p < .01.
Judged Propensity to Lie and Steal
Two additional scales assessed the extent the stimulus person was thought to lie and steal, respectively. Data corresponding to the likelihood of stealing are displayed in Table  3 . Analysis of variance reveals that the stimulus person is believed to be more likely to lie and steal in the immoral (Ms = 7.21 and 7.09, respectively) than the moral (Ms = 4.44 and 4.29, respectively) behavior condition, F(l, 38) = 70.19 and 54.82, respectively,^ < .001. Also, she is believed more likely to lie and steal in the moral (Ms = 6.20 and 6.06, respectively) than the immoral (Ms = 5.45 and 5.31, respectively) demand condition, F(l, 38) = 9.49 and 7.48, respectively, ps < .01. Finally, on the measure of stealing, the difference due to behavior was magnified in the reward compared to the cost condition, F(l,38) = 4.20, p<. 05.
Causal Attributions
Dispositional attributions. Subjects were asked to what extent the stimulus person's behavior was influenced by her personality or disposition (to be faithful or unfaithful). Analysis of variance revealed an interaction of behavior and demand, F(l, 38) = 22.98, p < .001, and no other significant effects. As shown in Table 3 , causal attributions to disposition were greater when behavior was inconsistent (M = 9.08) as opposed to consistent (M = 7.56) with situational demands. Unlike attributions of morality, these causal attributions are equally affected by situational demands in the moral (M = 7.53 and 9.13) and immoral (M =7.58 and 9.03) behavior conditions.
Situational attributions. Subjects also rated the extent the stimulus person's behav- ior was influenced by the situation described by her experienced friend. These ratings revealed a main effect of reward/cost, F(l, 38) = 6.82, p < .02, and an interaction of behavior and demand, F(l, 38) = I4l.54,p < .001. The main effect indicates the situation was thought to be more influential when costs (M = 6.36) rather than rewards (M = 5.39) were involved. The interaction reveals that attribution to the situation was greater when behavior was consistent (M = 8.86) rather than inconsistent with situational demands (M = 2.90). Unlike morality attribution, the effect of situational demands here is, if anything, stronger in the immoral (M = 2.60 and 8.98) than moral (M = 3.20 and 8.73) behavior condition.
Prior Probability
Subjects were asked how faithful the average movie actress is to her husband. These ratings fell near the middle of the 11-point scale (M = 5.87), suggesting that such beliefs are not likely to have produced the major results of this study.
Discussion
The present experiment investigated moral judgment along a new dimension of moral behavior-marital fidelity. The results converge with those of the first study. In general, morality attributions based on immoral (unfaithful) behavior are relatively unaffected by situational demands. Even in the presence of powerful pressures* facilitating immoral action, immoral behavior prompted observers to attribute a low level of morality to the actor (M = 3.38 on an 11-point scale). Moreover, these morality judgments generalized to other aspects of morality. A person who committed adultery was also judged to be more likely to lie and steal than one who remained faithful. Apparently, people perceive a close relation between the various aspects of morality.
Unlike morality attributions, causal attributions based on both moral and immoral behavior were strongly affected by situational demands. The weak relation between these two different measures is apparent in the immoral-behavior-immoral-demand cell. In this condition, subjects acknowledged strong situational causality (M = 8.98), yet they still attributed a relatively low level of morality to the stimulus person. Moreover, the correlation between situational causality and morality attribution is negligible (r = -.06) in this condition. This pattern suggests that the situational demands did little to relieve the stimulus person of responsibility for her actions (Goldman, 1970, pp. 214-220; Hamilton, 1980) . Writers on moral attribution (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1972) suggest that observers distinguish between different types of situational demand. For example, immoral action may be judged less negatively (in the immoral demand condition) when taken to avoid loss than when taken to secure gain. The morality attributions indicate support for this prediction (M = 4.30 and 2.45, respectively). However, from Table 2 it is also apparent that moral behavior is judged somewhat less positively (in the moral demand condition) when taken to avoid loss (M = 7.10) than when taken to secure gain (M -8.35). In general (across both types of behavior and both types of situational demand), attributions of morality tend to be less extreme (more moderate) when situational demands involve costs rather than rewards. In a situation in which strong demands (costs) are present, subjects may hesitate to make extreme attributions (Snyder & Jones, 1974) .
General Discussion
When observers attribute dispositional characteristics to an actor, these attributions are often strongly influenced by situational demands (Jones et al., 1961; Kelley & Michela, 1980) . A major finding of the present research, however, concerns the asymmetrical effect of situational demands on moral and immoral behavior: Attributions of morality based on immoral behavior are relatively unaffected by situational demands. That is, a person who steals or commits adultery is attributed a relatively low level of morality, regardless of extenuating situational demands. In general, this pattern held across several types of immoral behavior and "rewarding" as well as "costly" situational demands.
These findings were predicted on the basis of implicational relations between moral dispositions and moral behaviors. Specifically, observers reserve a moral disposition to describe persons who would rarely, if ever, attempt immoral behavior. However, observers are willing to grant that immoral persons will attempt moral behavior when it is in their own interest (Reeder et al., 1982) . The precise reason for this asymmetrical set of relations is not known. Reeder et al. (1982) , however, tentatively proposed several factors that may determine implicational relations. Among these factors, social desirability seems particularly relevant here. In general, socially desirable behavior is rewarded in the social environment, and for this reason, actors may be thought to be more likely to direct their behavior toward socially desirable (moral) rather than undesirable (immoral) ends. Regardless of the origin of these implicational relations, the present research suggests they may influence morality attributions. In a classic theoretical article, Jones and Davis (1965) present an alternative discussion of the role of social desirability in attribution. Their theory of correspondent inference suggests that an actor's socially undesirable behavior leads observers to make more extreme (correspondent) inferences about an actor's dispositions than does socially desirable behavior. In practice, most researchers have interpreted this to mean that when behavior deviates from situations! demands, it is socially undesirable and, therefore, likely to lead to extreme attributions. Thus, if an actor described her-or himself as inner directed, observers should perceive him or her as relatively more inner directed when the situation calls for other-directed behavior rather than inner-directed behavior (Jones & Davis, 1965, pp. 235-236) . In the present experiments, then, behavior that is inconsistent with situational demands (e.g., immoral behavior in response to demands for moral behavior or moral behavior in response to demands for immorality) would be socially undesirable. The strong main effect of situational demands observed in our experiments (for attributions of morality) supports the notion that such undesirable behavior receives extreme ratings compared to similar behavior that is socially desirable (behavior consistent with situational demands).
From the standpoint of correspondent inference theory (Jones & Davis, 1965) there is a second sense in which social desirability may be important. Independent of situational demands, immoral behavior is generally less socially desirable than is moral behavior. Thus, correspondent inference theory might predict that attributions based on immoral behavior would be more extreme than those based on moral behavior (across both types of situational demand). Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to compare the relative extremity of morality attributions based on these two types of behaviors. If such a tendency was to be operating in these studies, however, it is still not clear why (relatively extreme) attributions based on immoral behavior should be less affected by situational demands than are attributions based on moral behavior. This interaction of behavior and situational demands was found in both of the experiments reported in this article. Without additional theoretical clarification, it is not readily apparent why correspondent inference theory would predict this outcome (see Fincham & Jaspers, 1980, p. 84 , for a similar argument).
In contrast, the present approach (Reeder & Brewer, 1979 ) is specifically concerned with the manner in which implicational relations mediate the effect of situational demands on dispositional attribution. These implicational relations or schemata are a priori assumptions observers make about the range of behaviors a given disposition implies. As described earlier, 1 this position offers a reasonable account of the finding that morality attributions based on immoral behavior are relatively unaffected by situational demands.
Are dispositional attributions based on generally undesirable behavior (immoral behavior in our research) usually insensitive to situational demands? A review of the attribution literature suggests that this tendency may be overcome by a variety of other factors. For example, in some studies (Jones & .Harris, 1967; Reeder, Messick, & ,Van Avermaet, 1977) , attributions based on generally undesirable behavior (a pro-Castro speech or unskillful behavior, respectively) are actually more affected by situational demands than are attributions based on more desirable be-havior (an anti-Castro speech or skillful behavior, respectively). Considerations involving the prior probability of different attitudes (Jones & Harris, 1967) and role-playing limitations (Reeder et al., 1977) may be necessary to understand these latter results. Alternatively, it is possible that attributions based on socially undesirable behavior are unaffected by situational demands only when the behavior appears self-serving (as in the experiments reported in this article). In sum, although the general desirability of behavior may influence implicational relations and, thus, partially determine attributional correspondence, its impact is apparently moderated by other variables.
Unlike morality attributions, causal attributions were not affected by situational demands in an asymmetrical manner. Instead, causal attributions based on both moral and immoral behavior were strongly influenced by situational demands. In particular, when behavior was consistent (as opposed to inconsistent) with situational demands, it was attributed relatively more to the situation and relatively less to dispositional factors.
The discrepancy between morality attributions and causal attributions appears only in the immoral behavior condition. Here, causal attributions were strongly affected by demands, whereas morality attributions were not. When confronted with immoral behavior, observers may employ these two types of attributions for different purposes (Fincham & Jaspers, 1980; Hamilton, 1980; Harvey & Rule, 1978) . Causal attribution may be used to explain why or how the behavior occurred. For example, when immoral behavior occurs in the presence of facilitating demands, observers' attention may be drawn to the facilitating demands, or the situation. The actor's disposition (to be moral or immoral) enters the picture, as it were, only in response to these demands. The salience (Taylor & Fiske, 1978) of the situation, in this case, may contribute to the selection of the situation (as opposed to the actor's disposition) as the primary causal factor.
In contrast to causal attribution, morality attribution may be concerned more with sanctioning, or determining the actor's moral (rather than causal) responsibility for behavior (Hamilton, 1980) . Consistent with the implicational relations noted previously (Reeder et al., 1982) , philosophers make the point that moral persons are expected to resist temptations toward immoral behavior (Goldman, 1970; Mandelbaum, 1955) . Thus, situational demands often do not relieve the actor of moral responsibility for his or her actions. For example, the very act of succumbing to certain demands, such as a bribe, can form the basis of an attribution of weak moral character. In sum, there is reason to believe that causal attributions operate rather differently from morality attributions.
• Finally, the data provide strong evidence for moral generalization. Observers apparently believe that a person who commits adultery runs an increased probability of lying and stealing. A number of explanations can be offered. This generalization could represent the workings of either a common halo effect (Asch, 1946; Thorndike, 1920) or a negativity effect (Birnbaum, 1972; Kanouse & Hanson, 1972) in impression formation. Alternatively, the generalization may be viewed as an instance of the "fundamental attributional error" (Ross, 1977) . Accordingly, observers believe that a given instance of behavior (such as stealing) has broad implications for the person's character as a whole (cf. Ichheiser, 1970; Nisbett & Ross, 1980) . Observers may make strong assumptions about the consistency of an actor's behavior (Reeder et al., 1982) . Without additional data, of course, it is not established to what extent the present generalizations represent error. What little we know about the occurrence of actual immoral behavior, however, seems to suggest a lack of generalizability across different situations (Hartshorne & May, 1928) .
